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Abstract
At the beginning of Republic 2 (358e–359b), Plato has Glaucon ascribe a social contract 
theory to Thrasymachus and ‘countless others’. This paper takes Glaucon’s descrip-
tion to refer both within the text to Thrasymachus’ views, and outside the text to a 
series of works, most of which have been lost, On Justice or On Law. It examines what 
is likely to be the earliest surviving work that presents a philosophical defence of law 
and justice against those who would prefer their opposites, On Excellence by an anony-
mous author usually referred to as ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’; the views on these topics 
among the Socratics, including Crito, Simon the Cobbler, Aristippus of Cyrene, and 
Antisthenes; and Socrates’ debate with Hippias ‘On Justice’ in Xenophon’s Memorabilia 
(4.4.5–25). Its main contention is that the ‘countless others’ referred to by Glaucon 
points chiefly, but not solely, to the members of the circle of Socrates, who themselves 
espoused a range of views on justice and law, and their relations.
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1 Introduction
At the beginning of book II of Plato’s Republic, we witness a second sailing of 
sorts. Book I has ended aporetically, with no agreed definition of what justice 
is: Socrates characteristically affirms that the result of the prior discussion is 
that he ‘knows nothing’ (ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μηδὲν εἰδέναι) about what justice is, 
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or whether it is one of the virtues, or whether someone who is just is con-
sequently happy or not (Resp. 354b–c). In the light of Thrasymachus’ refusal 
to continue the discussion and Socrates’ aporia, things seem bleak for today’s 
discussion of the definition of justice, until Plato’s brother Glaucon, ‘never one 
to give up the fight’ (ἀεί τε ἀνδρειότατος),1 chastises Thrasymachus for giving 
into Socrates’ ‘snake-charming’ and demands a new start: he says, ‘what I’m 
anxious to hear about is what each of them [sc. justice and injustice] is, and 
what effect each has the capacity to produce, in and by itself, when it’s pres-
ent in the soul’ (Resp. 358b). In order to advance upon this goal, Glaucon takes 
on the role of dialectical sparring partner, renewing Thrasymachus’ praise of 
the unjust life – not because he believes this, but because he considers this 
approach fundamental to arriving at a definition of justice, and ultimately to 
providing an ‘encomium’ of justice ‘for what it is’ (Resp. 358d). It is at this point 
of the dialogue that Plato has his brother present an account of the nature 
and origins of justice, according to what Thrasymachus and ‘countless others’ 
(οἱ μυρίοι ἄλλοι) say about it:
So now you’re going to hear about the first subject I said I’d discuss, the 
nature and origins of justice. What they [sc. Thrasymachus and the count-
less others]2 say is that doing injustice is naturally a good thing and being 
a victim of it a bad thing, but that the badness of having it done to one 
outweighs the goodness of doing it; so that whenever people treat each 
other unjustly and get a taste of what it’s like both to do it and to have it 
done to them, those who aren’t able to choose the one while avoiding the 
other decide that they’ll gain by making a contract – to ban the doing of 
injustice, and so being the victim of it as well. It’s from there, so the story 
goes, that they start establishing laws, as contracts with each other, call-
ing what is prescribed by the law “lawful” and “just”; and that, they [sc. the 
countless others] say, is the origin and the essence of justice – something 
1 Translations of Plato’s Republic are by, or after, C. Rowe, Plato: The Republic (New York: 
Penguin, 2012).
2 To be sure, there is no evidence that Thrasymachus would accept the social contract solution 
advanced here. Indeed, at 367a, Thrasymachus’ thesis is also associated with an unnamed 
‘someone else’ (ἄλλος). However, the identity of the ‘countless others’ remains a question of 
concern. Is Plato referring generally to everyone (cf. τοῖς πολλοῖς at 358a), or to a smaller sub-
group of pro-democratic thinkers (which could also be implied by τοῖς πολλοῖς)? How much 
of this is tongue-in-cheek banter with friends and competitors within the Socratic circle? My 
argument does not exclude the possibility that Plato is referring generally to a widespread 
view, but rather it proceeds on the principle that being a Socratic need not exclude being 
pro-democratic, or espousing views that could be associated with more widespread opinions 
about justice.
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in between what’s best for us, acting unjustly and getting away with it, 
and what’s worst of all, being the victim of injustice and being power-
less to get one’s own back. Being in the middle like this, between the two 
things, what’s “just” is something a person is content to live with, not 
because it’s good, but because it makes up for one’s lack of strength to 
do injustice; anyone who can do it, they say, and is truly a man, wouldn’t 
ever make this contract, “not to do or to be the victim of injustice,” with 
anybody at all – he’d be crazy to do any such thing. So this, Socrates, or 
something like it, is the nature of justice, as the theory goes, and this is 
the sort of origin it has.
Resp. 2.358e2–359b7
Now this passage is justly famous for presenting what is sometimes taken to be 
one of the first, if not the first, social contract theory in the Ancient Greek world. 
The passages offers up an aetiology and an archaeology of justice, positing its 
‘nature’ (φύσις) and ‘natural origin’ (ἐξ ὧν πέφυκε): its nature is intermediary 
(μεταξὺ; ἐν μέσῳ)3 between what’s best and what’s worst for us, and its natural 
origin arises from the cycle of committing and receiving injustices, which pro-
gressively leads to the establishment of ‘laws as contracts’ (νόμους τίθεσθαι καὶ 
συνθήκας), to curb injustices, and to the nomination of ‘what is prescribed by 
the law’ (τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου ἐπίταγμα) as ‘lawful and just’ (νόμιμόν τε καὶ δίκαιον). 
Hence, the conclusion of this generative process is the final association of law 
with justice, a crucial association that makes possible the grounding of the 
legal processes in society in the justice guaranteed by nature.
Because Glaucon offers this position up dialectically, it functions here effec-
tively as what Aristotle would call an endoxon, a reputable opinion that can 
be advanced in order to pursue the question under investigation; hence, for 
the purposes of Plato’s dialogue, it plays an important role in resetting the 
debate concerning the identity of justice by providing a springboard to further 
possibilities to be discussed at least until the 4th book, and then again in the 
final books, of the Republic. There is, however, another aspect that this pas-
sage presents, which helps us to think about the origins of Plato’s own dialogue 
Πολιτεία ἤ περὶ δικαίου, as the title is passed down in some manuscripts, and as 
it was known to the editor and arranger of Plato’s works, Thrasyllus.4 For, by 
3 J. Annas, Virtue and Law in Plato and Beyond (Oxford: Oxford University Press), p. 11, refers to 
it as a ‘compromise’.
4 Technically, the work was known to Thrasyllus as πολιτεία ἢ περὶ δικαίου, πολιτικός, but 
the eponym πολιτικός need not indicate what Thrasyllus himself thought it was entitled. 
Generally, on the various attested titles of the work we know to be Plato’s Republic, see 
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pointing beyond the current discussion with Thrasymachus and outside the 
text to what the ‘countless others’ (οἱ μυρίοι ἄλλοι) say about justice, its defini-
tion and its origins, Glaucon raises the possibility for historians of philosophy 
that there were works devoted specifically to the topic Περὶ δικαίου, and which 
offered some room for debate about justice, what it is, and whether it is better 
to adhere to justice or injustice.
This paper will take its impetus from Glaucon’s description of the views of 
‘countless others’ and seek to develop an account of works, or discrete sections 
of works, we know to have been composed On Justice (Περὶ δικαίου), On Law 
(Περὶ νομοῦ), and On Law and Justice (Περὶ νομοῦ καὶ δικαίου). The goal here 
is to identify some common traits shared by texts or sections of works that 
ascribe to account for these topics in a philosophical way, and which might 
perhaps point to the existence of a genre of works On Justice, On Law, and 
On Law and Justice. This study will be confined to a 50-year period, from the 
end of the 5th century BCE, from what is likely to be the earliest surviving 
work that presents a philosophical defence of law and justice against those 
who would prefer their opposites, On Excellence (Περὶ ἀρετῆς) by an anony-
mous author usually referred to as ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, to the middle of the 
4th century BCE, when we can, with some plausibility, assign a terminus ante 
quem for Xenophon’s Memorabilia. Along the way this paper will discuss the 
treatment of law and justice from what little we can extract of the Socratics 
Crito, Simon the Cobbler, Aristippus of Cyrene, and Antisthenes, whose com-
positional period spans the last decade of the 5th century BCE until the middle 
of the 4th century BCE. In seeking to develop a sufficient context for the pro-
duction of more well-known dialogues and treatises in Plato’s Academy and 
Aristotle’s Lyceum, and because other contributions to this special issue of 
Polis discuss the writings especially of Plato on these topics, this paper will 
only mention these works by the way.5
2 Anonymus Iamblichi (ca. 400 BCE)
The earliest surviving extended philosophical theorization of law and justice 
is likely to be a fragmentary text that has come down to us under the name 
H. Tarrant, ‘Plato’s Republics’, PLATO: The electronic Journal of the International Plato Society 
12 (2012).
5 It is worth noting that much work remains to be done, for example, to unpack the relation-
ship of the pseudo-Platonic Minos (subtitled Περὶ νομοῦ) with Socratic accounts of law, and 
to identify the theories of justice exhibited in Aristotle’s fragmentary work Περὶ δικαιοσύνης.
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Anonymus Iamblichi (or, the “anonymous author/text from Iamblichus”). For 
reasons that have been developed elsewhere, I believe the work to have been 
originally titled On Excellence (Περὶ ἀρετῆς), although other titles are possi-
ble, including On Law and Justice (Περὶ νομοῦ καὶ δικαίου), since a topic that is 
treated extensively in Fragments 6–8 of the work.6 Most scholars agree that this 
text was written around the end of the 5th century or beginning of the 
4th century BCE, and authorship is sadly unknown.7 Scholarship has tended 
to focus on the connections between the thought of Anonymus Iamblichi 
and the Sophists, especially Protagoras of Abdera;8 and more recent attempts 
to track this treatise’s influences and intellectual interlocutors has pointed to 
Democritus of Abdera.9 This paper, however, will seek to place this text within 
the Socratic milieu, a project that has almost never been undertaken in the 
scholarship. For, as we will see, On Excellence shows many points of connec-
tion with Glaucon’s brief summary in Republic II of what the ‘countless others’ 
(οἱ μυρίοι ἄλλοι) think about the social contract and the origins and essence of 
law and justice (as against what Thrasymachus has proposed).10
A general summary the argumentative progression to the topic of law and 
justice helps to situate the content. Fragments 1 and 2 of Anonymus Iamblichi’s 
On Excellence present a nuanced argument in favour of hard work (φιλόπονος) 
and practice (ἄσκησις) in order to achieve ‘the whole of excellence’ (ἀρετή …
σύμπασα), which is arguably underpinned by its three parts (μέρος τι αὐτῆς): wis-
dom (σοφία), courage (ἀνδρεία), and eloquence (εὐγλωσσία).11 If one works hard 
at achieving excellence, whether as a whole or in its parts, she will eventually 
obtain a good reputation, which in turn engenders, and is further engendered 
by, trust, and which acts as a preventative to envy, the root of all interpersonal 
6  P.S. Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi, On Excellence (Peri Aretēs): A Lost Defense of 
Democracy’, in D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Early Greek Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2020), pp. 262–92, at pp. 270–73.
7  For a recent analysis of the question of authorship and the title, see Horky, ‘Anonymus 
Iamblichi’, pp. 262–63. Specifically on the title, though, it is worth mentioning here that 
the topics of law and justice are only treated in Fragments 3 (very briefly), 6, and 8.
8  Cf. M. Bonazzi, The Sophists, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 3; A. 
Ciriaci, L’Anonimo di Giamblico: Saggio critico e analisi dei frammenti (Naples: Bibliopolis, 
2011), p. 196; D. Musti and M. Mari, Anonimo di Giamblico, La pace e il benessere: Idee sull’ 
economia, la società, la morale (Milan: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli 2003), pp. 101–3.
9  Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, pp. 272–77.
10  For a nuanced account of the relationship between Plato and Thrasymachus, see 
D. El Murr, ‘Platon contre (et avec) Thrasymaque’, in B. Collette-Dučić, M.-A. Gavray, 
J.-M. Narbonne (eds), L’Esprit critique dans l’Antiquité, Vol. I. Critique et licence dans la 
Grèce antique (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2019), pp. 343–64.
11  For a more comprehensive analysis of Fragments 1 and 2, including the problem of the 
‘parts’ of ἀρετή in Anonymus Iamblichi, see Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, pp. 270–75.
404 Horky
Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek AND ROMAN Political Thought 38 (2021) 399–419
and social discord. Hard work and practice are crucial to achieving trust, and 
there are no short cuts to a truly good reputation. In Fragment 3, Anonymus 
Iamblichi considers the situation that occurs once someone has successfully 
attained excellence and its parts: once these have been brought to perfection, 
this person ‘should employ it for good and lawful [ends] (εἰς ἀγαθὰ καὶ νόμιμα 
καταχρῆσθαι δεῖ)’, since the opposite is ‘basest of all (πάντων κάκιστον)’. Hence, 
Fragment 3 sees the introduction of the notion of what is of ‘lawful’ (νόμιμα) to 
the text’s exhortation to attain excellence (ἀρετή) and its sundry parts. In order 
to achieve these good and lawful ends, so the author argues, the practitioner of 
excellence would need to be ‘the one who is beneficial (ὠφέλιμος) to as many 
people as possible’, a clear indication that Anonymus Iamblichi ascribes to a 
sort of euergetism – not the sort of monetary euergetism, which sounds nice 
but will perpetuate cycles of debt, but rather something else:
In sum, how could someone be a beneficiary of humans  – not by dis-
tributing money, but in some other way – and do these things not with 
baseness, but with excellence? This will be so in the following way: if he 
acts in support of laws and justice. For this is what establishes and binds 
together cities and human beings.
DK 89 = 98.5–12 Pistelli12
At this point of the argument, Anonymus Iamblichi would appear to accept 
the sort of commonplace assumption mentioned by Glaucon in Republic II, 
namely, that there is a strong relationship between laws and justice in sta-
ble human societies, and that these combined are, in Anonymus Iamblichi’s 
words, ‘what establishes and binds together cities and human beings’ (τάς τε 
πόλεις καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τὸ συνοικίζον καὶ τὸ συνέχον εἶναι). Indeed, it is worth 
noting here that, among Athenian orators of the late 5th century BCE and 
onwards, law and justice were intrinsically linked. Based on analysis of sev-
eral passages of Antiphon, Isaeus, Lysias, Aeschines, and Demosthenes, Mirko 
Canevaro has followed Edward Harris in arguing that, in democratic Athens, 
‘the discourses  … of law and justice are one and the same’.13 The passages 
12  References to Anonymus in this paper combine specification of section(s) in Diels-Kranz 
(DK89) with page and line numbers from H. Pistelli, Iamblichi Protrepticus. Ad fidem 
codicis florentini (Leipzig: Teubner, 1888), which allow for more precision. Translation of 
Anonymus Iamblichi’s text is from Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, (but in consideration 
of alternative readings proposed in A. Laks and G. Most, Early Greek Philosophy, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016)).
13  M. Canevaro, ‘Law and Justice’, in G. Martin (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Demosthenes 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 73–85, at p. 74: ‘In fact, far from being a standard 
405Law and Justice among the Socratics
Polis, The Journal for Ancient Greek AND ROMAN Political Thought 38 (2021) 399–419
mentioned by Canevaro and Harris appear to be programmatic and are rela-
tively indistinct:14 they demonstrate that correlative appeals to law and justice 
are rhetorically effective within the confines of the Athenian court in the 
5th and 4th centuries BCE, and this success would appear to be a function 
of Athenian democratic practices, such as the Oath of the Archons, which, 
according to the author of the Aristotelian Constitution of the Athenians (55.5), 
required newly selected archons to ‘swear that they will exercise their office 
justly and in accordance with the laws’ (ὁμνύουσιν δικαίως ἄρξειν καὶ κατὰ τοὺς 
νόμους). Still, these instances of appeal to law and justice in the same breath, 
many though they are among the orators, are a far cry from the elaborate and 
directed defence of law and justice found in Anonymus Iamblichi, which is 
part and parcel of a broader philosophical discussion of and exhortation to 
public excellence (ἀρετή) we find in Anonymus Iamblichi, whose ideas share 
not only with the theories coming out of Abdera in the late 5th century BCE 
(Protagoras and Democritus), but also with a native Athenian morality that 
traces back to Solon.15
For the moment, Anonymus Iamblichi leaves aside this issue and moves 
forward in Fragments 4 and 5 to discuss the disastrous psychological effects 
that attend excessive desire for things, including the continuation of one’s own 
life, money, and political contests, in contrast to the eternal immortality that is 
conferred upon those who achieve renown properly, with excellence.16 Instead 
of aiming for greed, so Anonymus Iamblichi argues in Fragment 6, one should 
strive to obey and defend the laws, and live as just a life as possible:
One should not aspire to greed (οὐκ ἐπὶ πλεονεξίαν ὁρμᾶν δεῖ), nor believe 
that power (κράτος) is an excellence (ἀρετή) founded upon greed, whereas 
obedience to the laws (τῶν νόμων ὑπακούειν) is cowardice; for this very 
of judgement alternative to the laws, justice is always mentioned by the orators virtually 
as a synonym of lawfulness. A good example is [Demosthenes] 43.52, where the speaker 
states: “This is what the law states, and this is what is just” (also e.g. 43.34, 60, 84; 46.18; 
(Arist. Ath. Pol. 55.5)). Accordingly, the discourses of law and of justice in the orators are 
one and the same.’ Also see E.M. Harris, The Rule of Law in Action in Democratic Athens 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 111–14, who lists evidence from Aeschines 
(3.199–200), Antiphon (5.85), Isaeus (2.47, 4.31, 6.65, 8.46, 9.35, 11.18, 11.35), and Lysias (9.19, 
14.22, 14.42, 14.47).
14  With one exception: Demosthenes, Oration 25: Against Aristogeiton 1.15–17 (326/5 BCE).
15  On Protagoras and Democritus in relation to Anonymus Iamblichi, see Horky, ‘Anonymus 
Iamblichi’, pp. 272–76. Cf. Solon Fr. 15 West: ‘many base men are wealthy, and many good 
men poor; / but we will not trade their wealth for excellence (ἀρετή), since this is always 
secure, / while one man holds his money, now another.’
16  Again, see my more comprehensive discussion at Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, pp. 279–81.
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notion is the most ignoble (πονηροτάτη), and everything opposed to what 
is good arises out of it, viz. baseness and harm. For if humans have been 
born naturally (ἐφύσαν) incapable of surviving alone (ἀδύνατοι καθ’ ἕνα 
ζῆν), formed associations with one another under the compulsion of 
necessity (συνῆλθον δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῇ ἀναγκῇ εἴκοντες), and discovered 
all the means of survival and mechanisms (πᾶσα δὲ ἡ ζωὴ αὐτοῖς εὕρηται 
καὶ τὰ τεχνήματα) for achieving it; and if it was not possible to exist with 
one another and to pass their lives in a state of lack of respect of law 
(ἀνομίᾳ) (for their losses would be greater in this state than if they were 
to be alone) – by reason of these necessities, then, law and justice rule 
over human beings (τὸν τε νόμον καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἐμβασιλεύειν τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις) and can in no way be displaced. For these [sc. law and justice] are 
strongly bound (ἐνδεδέσθαι) in [us] by nature (φύσει). Indeed, if someone 
were to be born in possession of such a nature as this, invulnerable in his 
flesh (ἄτρωτος τὸν χρῶτα), immune to disease and affections (ἄνοσός τε καὶ 
ἀπαθής), of supernatural ability (ὑπερφυής), adamantine (ἀδαμάντινος) in 
body and life, one might suppose that power founded upon greed would 
suffice for someone of this sort (for someone like this would have the 
capacity of going unpunished if he were to refuse to submit to the law); 
and yet his supposition would be incorrect. For even if there could be 
someone like this, which could never happen, it would only be by ally-
ing himself with the laws and justice, fortifying them, and making use of 
his strength for their sake, and for the sake of what supports them, that 
someone like this could ensure his safety; otherwise, he would not last. 
For all humans would resolve to stand opposed to someone of this nature 
because of their respect for law (εὐνομία), and the multitude (τὸ πλῆθος) 
would prevail over and overcome a man of this sort, either through skill 
or might (τέχνῃ ἢ δυνάμει). Accordingly, it is evident that true power (αὐτὸ 
τὸ κράτος), which is power properly understood, is preserved by law and 
justice. (89 = 100.5–101.6)
Here, Anonymus Iamblichi further develops his natural social contract theory 
by describing it in evolutionary terms.17 He argues that, if humans were born 
17  It is interesting to compare this passage with what is associated with the ‘countless others’ 
in the Republic. There are important similarities, but the differences are equally striking: 
the ‘countless others’ focus on the gains and losses that most individuals incur in lawless 
or lawful states, whereas Anonymus Iamblichi is mostly concerned with broader social 
stability in states that are lawless or lawful, in the context of the pursuit of excellence. 
To be sure, the concerns over individual happiness and flourishing under various social 
conditions are explored in Fragments 4 and 5 of Anonymus Iamblichi’s text.
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without the capacity to survive or thrive (ζῆν) alone; and if therefrom neces-
sity compelled them to form associations; and if therefrom they discovered the 
technical means to survive and overcome death; and if therefrom they became 
dissolute and couldn’t find a way to get along, as they were in a lawless state 
(ἀνομίᾳ); it necessarily follows that law and justice would emerge and come to 
‘rule over’ (ἐμβασιλεύειν) humans, since in these circumstances law and justice 
would be shown to be naturally bound to us (ἐνδεδέσθαι … φύσει). It is interest-
ing to note the series of conditionals here: Anonymus Iamblichi would appear 
to be accepting these propositions as assumptions that cannot be proven; 
but by accepting them, he is able to arrive at a conclusion that suits his pur-
poses rhetorically.18 Similarly, he says, if a rogue Superman were to arrive on 
the scene, he would be well advised to ally himself with law and justice; for the 
collective power and ingenuity of the many would eventually overpower any 
individual’s strength of the life and body.
Fragment 7 and the first part of Fragment 8 elaborate a theory of personal 
and social psychology hinted at earlier in the work and embed it in a praise of 
the trust (πίστις) that functions as a mechanism for social cohesion.19 The last 
half of Fragment 8 is worth mentioning, however, since it takes up once again 
the discussion of the Superman, who has now been identified as a tyrant:
And tyranny, an evil of so great a magnitude and character, is a result of 
nothing other than lack of respect for law (ἀνομία). Some people, who 
conjecture incorrectly, think that a tyrant comes to power from some 
other cause, and that humans deprived of their freedom are not them-
selves the causes of it, but [that they are deprived of their freedom] 
because they were forced by the tyrant once he has come to power. But 
their reasoning is incorrect; for whoever believes that a king or tyrant 
arises out of anything other than a lack of respect for law and greed is a 
fool. It is whenever all humans turn to baseness (κακία) that this happens; 
for it is impossible for humans to thrive (ζῆν) without laws and justice. So 
when these two things, law and justice, relinquish the multitude (ἐκ τοῦ 
πλήθους ἐκλίπῃ), at that very time the administration and supervision of 
18  One is reminded, of course, of Protagoras’ speech in Plato’s Protagoras. This raises the 
question of the relationship between Protagoras’ own views on the social contract, Plato’s 
presentation of them in the Protagoras, and Anonymus Iamblichi. As M. Bonazzi, ‘Ethical 
and Political Thought in Antiphon’s Truth and Concord’, in D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Early Greek 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 149–68, at pp. 155–56 argues, such argu-
ments in defence of the social contract guaranteed by laws were challenged by the sophist 
Antiphon.
19  On trust in Anonymus Iamblichi, see Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, pp. 284–86.
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these things bid a retreat to a single man. For how else could sovereignty 
devolve to a single man, unless the law, which is beneficial to the multi-
tude, is banished (τοῦ νόμου ἐξωσθέντος)? (89 = 103.20–104.6)
According to Anonymus Iamblichi, those people who think that the tyrant 
rises up and seizes control of the polis under his own power are fools: it is 
the people’s surrendering of their morality to ‘baseness’ (κακία), which occurs 
when law and justice take their leave from the multitude (ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους 
ἐκλίπῃ) and lawlessness (ἀνομία) pervades, that leads to the ascendancy of 
a tyrant.20 The process here is described like an ostracism, in which law and 
justice, which provide fundamental benefits to the people, are banished 
(ἐξωσθέντος)21 – presumably by the people themselves.
To conclude this part of the paper: when, in the reboot of the debate in 
Republic II, Glaucon speaks of the ‘countless others’ (οἱ μυρίοι ἄλλοι) who talk 
about justice and its origins in the social contract, whereby law and justice are 
identified as related, he is referring to people such as Anonymus Iamblichi, 
who, if we are to date his text to 400 BCE, provides the most complete natural 
social contract theory prior to Plato’s works that survives in Greek literature. 
Indeed, his discussion of ἀρετή competes with the speech of Protagoras in 
Plato’s work by the same name in terms of both creativity and argumenta-
tive energy, whilst paying even greater attention to its democratic audience, 
which might, with the right cues and catch words, be compelled to agree with 
him. Anonymus Iamblichi’s defence of law and justice is robust, supported by 
imaginative thought experiments whilst remaining sensitive to the sorts of 
practical issues that faced the everyday Athenian. At this stage, I will turn to 
what I take to be the most probable milieu within which this treatise (or pam-
phlet) was produced: the Socratics. It will emerge that Socrates is the common 
link between such elaborate reconceptualizations of law, justice, and their 
relations, which makes it probable that when Glaucon refers to the ‘countless 
others’ (οἱ μυρίοι ἄλλοι) in addition to Thrasymachus, he would appear to be 
referring to other Socratics; and if this is right, it would compel us to wonder 
20  Baseness is discussed earlier in the work at Fragment 3, as the opposite of excellence 
(ἀρετή). See Horky, ‘Anonymus Iamblichi’, pp. 277–78. One is reminded of Solon’s (Fr. 4 
West) paradigmatic description of ‘Lawlessness’ (Δυσνομίη), which is ascendancy when 
the inhabitants of Athens allow themselves to become foolish and ruled by money, and 
when the ‘mind of the people’s leaders is unjust’ (δήμου θ᾿ ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος) (lines 7–8): 
‘Lawlessness proffers the greatest evils to the city’ (κακὰ πλεῖστα πόλει Δυσνομίη παρέχει, 
line 31). Also relevant here is Solon’s claim that it is due to their ‘ignorance’ (ἀϊδρίῃ) that 
the people become enslaved to a tyrant (Fr. 9 West).
21  Compare with Soph. OC 1296 and 1330. Generally, on exile and ostracism in Athens, see 
S. Forsdyke, Exile, Ostracism, and Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006), pp. 90–204.
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whether Anonymus Iamblichi too is to be classed as a sort-of eclectic Socratic, 
who not only draws upon traditions of moral theory and civic ideology in 
Athens, but also imbues them with Abderite principles concerning personal 
education and human progress.
3 The Socratics Crito, Simon, Aristippus, Antisthenes,  
Xenophon (ca. 400–ca. 350 BCE)
In the previous section we examined the wide-ranging defense of law and 
justice offered by a late 5th century BCE author, Anonymus Iamblichi, who 
showed us how a defense of law and justice could be rooted in the advance-
ment of a natural social contract theory. This shows strong connections to the 
views advanced endoxically by Glaucon in Republic II, and suggests that there 
might have been a genre, or at least a topical discourse, devoted to studying 
law, justice, and their relations, prior to and contemporary with Plato’s compo-
sition of the Republic. Now we will turn to those figures who might be implied 
as objects of Plato’s criticism there, his fellow associates of Socrates, who, as 
we will see, advanced a range of positions on law, on justice, and on their rela-
tions.22 The absence of surviving evidence severely hinders our approach, 
however, as in some cases only hints at what certain members of Socrates’ cir-
cle believed about these subjects remain. We will take those figures for whom 
any evidence survives at all and discuss them progressively, from least amount 
of surviving evidence to most. Hence, we will consider the Socratics Crito of 
Athens, Simon the Cobbler, Aristippus of Cyrene, Antisthenes of Athens, and 
Xenophon of Athens.
For two of these figures, Crito and Simon the Cobbler (fl. ca. 400–ca. 350 BCE?), 
the scant information we have concerning their views on law and justice come 
from Diogenes Laertius’ lists of their works, all of which have been lost:
So, Crito wrote seventeen dialogues which come down in a single vol-
ume, and they are entitled: On the Fact that People are not Good because 
of Learning … On Law …
Diog. Laert. 2.121
22  Generally, on the Socratics, see the introduction of George Boys-Stones’ and Christopher 
Rowe’s source book, The Circle of Socrates: Readings in the First-Generation Socratics 
(Indianapolis: Hackett), pp. vii–xiii, and F. Decleva Caizzi, ‘Minor Socratics’, in M.L. Gill 
and P. Pellegrin (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Philosophy (Malden, MA: Wiley, 2006).
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That is why people call his dialogues ‘leathern’. There are thirty-three dia-
logues which come down in a single volume … First and second books of 
On Justice, On Virtue, That It Cannot be Taught … On Law …
Diog. Laert. 2.122
While no positive content on their ideas about law and justice can be obtained, 
it is worth noting a few features: first, Crito allegedly wrote a dialogue On Law, 
the content of which might be speculatively assumed to relate in some way to 
Plato’s dialogue Crito, which features several points of contact with what has 
been mentioned above in discussion of Anonymus Iamblichi: concern over 
the value of public reputation (44c–d; 47a–48a); the frivolity of clinging to 
one’s life (47e); the relative justice of giving money (48c–d); the status of com-
munal agreements, whether necessary or not (52d–e); and whether it’s just or 
unjust to break the law (45a; 50b–54d). On Simon the Cobbler, we have even 
less evidence to work with, although Diogenes tells us that he wrote on several 
relevant subjects: two dialogues on the topic of justice, one dialogue on law, 
and a dialogue on the fact that virtue cannot be taught.23 This latter position 
is of course one that could be taken up by various Socratics, and indeed we 
hear of a dialogue that Crito wrote entitled On the Fact that People are not Good 
because of Learning.24
For his own part, Aristippus of Cyrene (fl. ca. 410–ca. 350 BCE) would appear 
to have written treatises on various subjects related to our study: a work On 
Virtue, and a Protrepticus, which presumably was an exhortation to philosophy, 
like those of Antisthenes and Aristotle:25
According to Sotion in his second book and Panaetius, these are his [sc. 
Aristippus’] writings: … On Virtue, Exhortation [to Philosophy] …
Diog. Laert. 2.85
23  Sadly, the majority of evidence outside of this report of Diogenes concerning Simon’s 
philosophical views comes from the so-called Socratic Epistles, which are a later construc-
tion (possibly 3rd century CE) that associates Simon with ideal Cynic behaviours. There, 
Simon criticizes extravagant living and praises temperance, but nothing survives of his 
views on law or justice. For an excellent discussion, see R.F. Hock, ‘Simon the Shoemaker 
as an Ideal Cynic’, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 17 (1976), pp. 41–53.
24  Generally, see C. Rowe, ‘The Teachability of Aretē among the Socratics’, in D. Wolfsdorf 
(ed.), Early Greek Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 629–47, who discusses 
the views on the teachability of ἀρετή by Euclides, Antisthenes, Xenophon, Aeschines, 
and Plato.
25  These works only survive in fragments, but the Protreptici of Clement of Alexandria and 
Iamblichus are extant. I discuss Antisthenes’ Protrepticus below.
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Aristippus, a philosopher from Cyrene, said that kingship was as different 
from tyranny as law from lawlessness and freedom from slavery.
Stob., Ecl. 4.8.18
Asked once what advantage philosophers have, he [sc. Aristippus] said, 
‘If all the laws are taken away, we shall go on living in a similar way’.
Diog. Laert. 2.68
We learn from this meagre evidence two things: that Aristippus saw law as 
opposed to lawlessness but analogous to kingship and freedom; and that, 
in a situation where law were to be no longer operative, the philosopher 
would not change his approach to his life. We are left to infer whether this 
is because the philosopher is above the law and need not heed it, or whether 
laws are simply immaterial to the philosopher’s integrity, independence, and 
self-determination.26 Indeed, we can only speculate about the contents of 
Aristippus’ Protrepticus, if that indeed is a separate work, but there is reason 
to believe it focused on promoting, in the words of Tsouna, ‘a primarily philo-
sophical education oriented toward the development of one’s personality, the 
acquisition of right ethical principles, and the cultivation of the sort of wisdom 
conducive to happiness’.27 We are firmly in the region of personal ethics, and it 
is telling that no political works devoted to discussing law or justice are attested 
for Aristippus.28 Furthermore, in none of the above cases of Socratics is it obvi-
ous that there is any strong association implied between law and justice, as we 
find in the social contract described by Glaucon. To borrow from Plato’s Crito, 
when Socrates advances anything approaching an associative explanation of 
what justice is, he says that it is the same as living well and nobly (48b).
It is with Antisthenes of Athens (fl. ca. 420 BCE–ca. 365 BCE), however, that 
we see formulations more congenial to what we saw in Glaucon’s description 
of the views of the ‘countless others’ in Republic II and Anonymus Iamblichi:
26  As V. Tsouna, ‘Aristippus of Cyrene’, in D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Early Greek Ethics (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 380–411, notes (at p. 398), the much-discussed passage 
from Xenophon’s Memorabilia (2.1.1–34) shows Aristippus rejecting the traditional divi-
sion between ruling and being ruled, in favour of a cosmopolitan life of the perpetual and 
ubiquitous xenos (‘stranger’), guaranteed by a life of freedom (2.1.8–11).
27  Tsouna, ‘Aristippus’, p. 392. It is possible that when Diogenes Laertius preserves the titles 
Περὶ ἀρετῆς, Προτρεπτικός, he is not referring to two works, but simply to one work ‘On 
Virtue, a protreptic [writing]’. This is how Antisthenes’ work On Justice and Courage is 
presented by Diogenes Laertius (see below).
28  Aristippus has been thought to evoke a Homeric ‘beggar hero’ like Odysseus, who lives 
by travelling around the world without being beholden to political systems (cf. Decleva 
Caizzi, ‘Minor Socratics’, p. 132).
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His [sc. Antisthenes’] writings come down in ten volumes … in the second 
volume there is On Justice and Courage, an exhortation in three books … 
in the third volume there is On Law or Republic, On Law or On Fineness 
and Justice …
Diog. Laert. 6.15
Favourite themes with him were the following. He would prove that vir-
tue can be taught; that nobility belongs to none other than the virtuous. 
And he held virtue to be sufficient in itself to ensure happiness, since 
it needed nothing else except the strength of a Socrates. And he main-
tained that virtue is an affair of deeds and does not need a store of words 
or learning; that the wise man is self-sufficing, for all the goods of oth-
ers are his; that ill repute is a good thing and much the same as pain; 
that the wise man will be guided in his public acts not by the established 
laws but by the law of virtue (καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους 
πολιτεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς) … Diocles records the following 
sayings of his: To the wise man nothing is foreign or strange. A good man 
deserves to be loved. Good men are friends. Make allies of men who are at 
once brave and just (συμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς εὐψύχους ἅμα καὶ δικαίους). 
Virtue is a weapon that cannot be taken away. It is better to be with a 
handful of good men fighting against all the bad, than with hosts of bad 
men against a handful of good men. Pay attention to your enemies, for 
they are the first to discover your mistakes. Esteem a just man above a 
kinsman (τὸν δίκαιον περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ συγγενοῦς). Virtue is the 
same for women as for men. Good actions are fair and evil actions foul. 
Count all wickedness foreign and alien. Wisdom is a most sure strong-
hold which never crumbles away nor is betrayed. Walls of defence must 
be constructed in our own impregnable reasonings.
Diog. Laert. 6.10–13
This makes it clear that legislation itself is necessarily only about those 
who are equal, both in birth and in capacity. There is no law for men of 
outstanding quality; they are themselves the law. Anyone who tried to 
legislate for them would be ridiculous; they would probably say what 
Antisthenes had the lions say when the hares harangued them and tried 
to claim equal rights for all.
Arist. Pol. 2.13.1284a11–17
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[Antisthenes] used to advise the Athenians to pass a vote that donkeys 
were horses; when they thought that unreasonable, he said, ‘Well, gener-
als are made here without their having learned anything, but just by a 
show of hands’.
Diog. Laert. 6.8
With Antisthenes, we get a better sense of how a Socratic might approach 
the tangle of issues related to law, justice, and (as with Anonymus Iamblichi) 
ἀρετή. Like Aristippus, Antisthenes wrote a protreptic work (in three books), in 
which he exhorted to justice and courage;29 it is not implausible that this work 
contained the ‘favourite themes’ mentioned by Diogenes Laertius (6.10–11) in 
the first summary of Antisthenes’ views:30 that virtue (ἀρετή) can be taught 
(contrary to Simon the Cobbler and, presumably, Crito); that the virtuous are 
the only truly noble people; that virtue is evidenced in deeds, not words; that 
virtue is sufficient for happiness, which is evidenced by the strength of charac-
ter of Socrates; that the wise man is self-sufficient, since all the goods of other 
people are his (a curious notion!); and, perhaps most importantly for our anal-
ysis, that the wise man is guided not by mere conventional laws, but by the ‘law 
of virtue’ (κατὰ τὸν [νόμον] τῆς ἀρετῆς).31
With this last topic, we may see the issues raised by Antisthenes’ praise of 
virtue dovetail with the topics presented in his lost Περὶ νόμου ἢ περὶ καλοῦ 
καὶ δικαίου. And, indeed, on the topic of law (νόμος), we have the precious tes-
timonium of Aristotle, which would appear to show Antisthenes defending 
a position like that of Aristippus, whereby the philosopher is above conven-
tional laws, which should not be written with him in mind – note the playful 
appeal to animals here, and in the testimonium given by Diogenes Laertius 
(6.8): perhaps Antisthenes followed Socrates in composing Aesopic tales, or at 
least in using animals as a point of reference for human affairs.32 It is clear that 
such appeals justified Antisthenes’ criticisms of democracy (‘show of hands’), 
29  Cf. Rowe, ‘Teachability’, pp. 634–35.
30  Decleva Caizzi, ‘Minor Socratics’, p. 127, refers to this collection of doxai as ‘rather disor-
dered’, but one wonders whether a list like this, for example, could have been extracted 
from a Socratic dialogue. After all, evidence from Plato’s and Xenophon’s Socratic dia-
logues shows that Socrates did not always argue in an orderly fashion.
31  Cf. S. Prince, ‘Antisthenes’ Ethics’, in D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Early Greek Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2020), pp. 325–60, at p. 340.
32  One is reminded of Plutarch’s philosophical dialogue Gryllus, where Odysseus returns 
to collect his men from Circe’s cave, only to find that his former soldier, now a pig called 
Gryllus, explains that does not want to be reintegrated into the society of men because 
humans have less virtue than pigs (986f–988f).
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or at least arguments that exempted the wise man from democratic legal inter-
ference, contrary to what the Crito argues in the personification of the Laws 
(50b ff.). The implicit suggestion is that merely human laws and systems of 
justice do not apply to the σοφός, who is superior by nature to others – just like 
the lion is to the hare.
Obviously, such thoughts, especially as they are focused in the character of 
Socrates, would contribute to the development of Cynic, and, one might imag-
ine, of Stoic ethics. Because of the poor state of the evidence, it is difficult to 
know how precisely Antisthenes formulated these points (and we should won-
der at the ultimate doxographical sources of Diogenes’ material, which would 
almost certainly be contaminated with Stoic ideas).33 Be that as it may, it’s 
clear that Antisthenes treated both the subjects of law and justice in his works, 
and it is possible that he, like Iamblichus many centuries later (and probably 
like Aristotle), treated them both in relation to ἀρετή in the Protrepticus. In the 
case of one Socratic, however, we have an explicit account of the purported 
relationship between law and justice, and that figure is Xenophon, to whom 
we now turn.
Xenophon’s Memorabilia was almost certainly written after Plato’s Republic 
(it can be dated to after the battle of Leuctra in 371 BCE), which is interesting 
for a variety of reasons: among others, it demonstrates how a Socratic might 
have sought to rescue the popular image of Socrates from the powerful but 
almost assuredly deeply biased perspective offered by Plato – especially in a 
work like the Republic. No less the case on the topic of justice and its rela-
tionship to law, which, in the aftermath of Plato’s Republic, must have offered 
ample opportunity for disagreement, especially if the contents of the Republic 
were to be taken as an expression of the views not of Plato, but of Socrates 
(as, for example, Aristotle may have taken them to be).34 Near the end of the 
Memorabilia, Xenophon advances his own version of Socrates’ debate concern-
ing justice and its definition, in a selection running from IV.4.5–25, effectively 
titled Περὶ τοῦ δικαίου.35 The passage begins with Hippias arriving from abroad 
33  Diocles of Magnesia, who lived in the 2nd or 1st century BCE, is quoted by Diogenes 
Laertius 19 times and appears to have written a range of works on the history of philoso-
phy (on which, see K. Fleischer, ‘Structuring the History of Philosophy: A Comparison 
between Philodemus and Diogenes Laertius in the Light of New Evidence’, Classical 
Quarterly 69.2 (2020), pp. 684–699, at p. 684 n. 2).
34  Ar. Pol. 2.1, 1261a518; 2.3, 1264b29–1265a14. It is controversial whether we can explicitly 
identify these views with Socrates the person, Socrates the character in Plato’s Republic, 
or Socrates as known through other literary accounts (e.g. the lost Socratic dialogues, the 
writings of Xenophon).
35  Generally, on the Xenophontic Socrates’ views on law and justice, see D.M. Johnson, 
‘Xenophon’s Socrates on Law and Justice’, Ancient Philosophy 23 (2003), pp. 255–81 and 
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and hearing Socrates discussing how a range of skilled activities can be taught 
by teachers, but not justice, for which no teacher is easily found:
Such views frequently found expression in his conversations with differ-
ent persons; I recollect the substance of one that he [sc. Socrates] had 
with Hippias of Elis concerning justice. Hippias, who had not been in 
Athens for a considerable time, found Socrates talking: he was saying that 
if you want to have a man taught cobbling or building or smithing or rid-
ing, you know where to send him to learn the craft; some indeed declare 
that if you want to train up a horse or an ox in the way he should go, 
teachers abound. And yet, strangely enough, if you want to learn justice 
yourself, or to have your son or servant taught it, you know not where to 
go for a teacher.
Mem 4.4.5
There is some initial friendly banter between the two men, and Hippias, always 
impressed with his own ability to make novel discoveries whilst maintaining 
consistency, claims to have discovered a stable definition of justice that cannot 
be contradicted (i.e. that is superior to convention).36 Socrates responds that 
he would love to hear an account concerning justice that will extirpate civil 
stasis, in the many ways in which this manifests itself in the polis. But Hippias 
backs down, unwilling to advance his own account until he has heard Socrates’ 
own ‘opinion’ (ὅ τι νομίζεις; γνώμη) about justice:
[Soc.:] ‘On my word, you mean to say that you have made a great dis-
covery, if jurymen are to cease from voting different ways, citizens from 
disputing and litigation, and wrangling about the justice of their claims, 
cities from quarrelling about their rights and making war; and for my 
part, I don’t see how to tear myself away from you till I have heard about 
your great discovery’. [Hipp.:]  ‘But I vow you shall not hear unless you 
first declare your own opinion about the nature of Justice; for it’s enough 
that you mock at others, questioning and examining everybody, and 
never willing to render an account yourself or to state an opinion about 
anything’.
Mem. 4.4.8–9
D. Morrison, ‘Xenophon’s Socrates on the Just and the Lawful’, Ancient Philosophy 15 
(1995), pp. 329–47.
36  Compare Hippias’ complaints (Pl. Prt. 337c–338b) about law, which is ‘tyrant over humans’ 
(τύραννος τῶν ἀνθρώπων) and ‘commits violence against many things, contrary to nature’.
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Socrates advances upon justice via negativa, enumerating the varieties of 
injustice, and asserting that justice might be simply abstaining from perform-
ing injustices – a proposal that might hold traction over Hippias, who cares 
much more about evidencing justice in actions rather than in words. But this 
is unsatisfactory to Hippias, who complains that Socrates is taking his typi-
cal stance on things, refusing to advance any positive doctrines concerning a 
topic. It is at this stage that Socrates advances the proposition that the just is 
what is lawful:
[Hipp.:] ‘Even now, Socrates, you are clearly trying to avoid stating what 
you think justice to be. You are saying not what the just do, but what they 
don’t do’. [Soc.:] ‘Well, I thought that unwillingness to do injustice was suf-
ficient proof of Justice. But, if you don’t think so, see whether you like this 
better: I say that what is lawful is just’. [Hipp.:]  ‘Do you mean, Socrates, 
that lawful and just are the same thing?’ [Soc.:] ‘I do’. [Hipp.:] ‘Because I 
don’t see what you mean by lawful or what you mean by just’. [Soc.:] ‘Does 
the expression “laws of a state” convey a meaning to you?’ [Hipp.:]  ‘It 
does’. [Soc.:] ‘And what do you think they are?’ [Hipp.:] ‘Covenants made 
by the citizens whereby they have enacted what ought to be done and 
what ought to be avoided’. [Soc.:]  ‘Then would not that citizen who 
acts in accordance with these act lawfully, and he who transgresses 
them act unlawfully?’ [Hipp.]  ‘Yes, certainly’. [Soc.:]  ‘And would not he 
who obeys them do what is just, and he who disobeys them do what is 
unjust?’ [Hipp.:]  ‘Certainly’. [Soc.:]  ‘Then would not he who does what 
is just be just, and he who does what is unjust be unjust?’ [Hipp.:]  ‘Of 
course’. [Soc.:] ‘Consequently he who acts lawfully is just, and he who acts 
unlawfully is unjust’. ‘Laws’, said Hippias, ‘can hardly be thought of much 
account, Socrates, or observance of them, seeing that the very people 
who passed them often reject and amend them’.
Mem. 4.4.11–14
Because they end up basically where they started  – that to act justly is the 
substance of justice, and vice versa for injustice  – Hippias exhibits frustra-
tion, seeking to challenge Socrates by claiming that laws themselves, and their 
observance, are not intrinsically valuable, because those individual agents 
who motivate and agree them later change their minds.
Socrates’ solution to this objection is complex, involving analogy with 
declarations of war by a state, among other comparisons and rhetorical exhor-
tations; but the point that sticks and wins the day involves many of the same 
terms seen above in Anonymus Iamblichi:
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And again, agreement is considered the greatest blessing for cities: their 
senates and their best men constantly exhort the citizens to agree, and 
everywhere in Greece there is a law that the citizens must promise under 
oath to agree, and everywhere they take this oath. The object, in my opin-
ion, is not that the citizens may vote for the same choruses, not that they 
may praise the same pipers, not that they may select the same poets, not 
that they may enjoy the same pleasures, but that they may obey the laws. 
For those cities whose citizens stick with them prove strongest and enjoy 
most happiness; but without agreement no city can be made a good city, 
no house can be made a prosperous house. And how is the individual 
citizen less likely to incur penalties from the state, and more certain to 
gain honor than by obeying the laws? How less likely to be defeated in 
the courts or more certain to win? Whom would anyone rather trust as 
guardian of his money or sons or daughters? Whom would the whole city 
think more trustworthy than the man of lawful conduct?
Mem. 4.4.16–17
Given the context we mentioned earlier about the archontic oath that marked 
the beginning of a magistrate’s term of office in Athens, we should not be sur-
prised to see its appearance here. But the emphasis in Socrates’ defense of law 
and justice is placed on a term we haven’t explicitly seen in the other Socratics, 
or in Anonymus Iamblichi, who never uses it: ὁμονοία (‘agreement’, or ‘con-
cord’). Indeed, Socrates here appeals to ὁμόνοια in universal terms, asserting 
that all Greek city-states – we must here think that he means not just democ-
racies, but oligarchies too – require their citizens to swear an oath to strive for 
agreement within the polis.37 Implicit within Socrates’ brief speech is the idea 
that there is an intrinsic relationship, reflected in the etymological similarity, 
between communal agreement (ὁμονοία), swearing an oath (ὁμονοεῖν, ὀμνύναι), 
and, I suggest, the law (νόμος): in a way, communal agreement essentially is the 
swearing of an oath to preserve the city’s laws. This is not the typical etymo-
logical derivation of law (νόμος) from distribution (νεμεῖν), or related to song 
(νόμοι), versions of which are attested for Plato in the Laws (700b–c), pseudo-
Archytas’ On Law and Justice (Fr. 4.e Horky & Johnson), the pseudo-Platonic 
37  One wonders how this account would square against Antiphon’s work On Agreement 
(Περὶ ὁμονοίας), which survives in a small number of fragments (for instance, see Laks and 
Most, Early Greek Philosophy, 37 D41–63), many of which are too short to integrate into an 
argument. At any rate, if Antiphon treated law or justice in his work, it is doubtful that he 
would have advanced a position anything like that of Socrates here.
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Minos (317d–e, 321c–e), and even Cicero (Laws 1.18–19).38 As an original for-
mulation, Xenophon’s ὁμονοία presents a sophisticated adaptation of the koina 
concerning law, justice, and their relations, in Glaucon’s speech in Republic II 
and Anonymous Iamblichi, in a universalizing light that places the emphasis 
on the oaths that citizens offer up to states, owing to which human happiness 
is possible.
Remarkably, it is the argument regarding ὁμονοία, understood as the practice 
of upholding a sworn oath to the laws, that ultimately convinces Hippias that 
Socrates’ definition of justice as law suffices and is true:
[Soc.:] ‘So, Hippias, I declare lawful and just to be the same thing. If you 
are of the contrary opinion, tell me’. ‘Truly, Socrates’, answered Hippias, 
‘I don’t think my opinion is contrary to what you have said about justice’.
Mem. 4.4.18
There would be much more to say with regard to Xenophon’s approach to law 
and justice, including the passage that follows, which features a famous discus-
sion of unwritten and divine laws; but for the purposes of this paper, what has 
been said is enough to suggest the sorts of arguments Socrates presents there.
4 Conclusions
Our survey of late 5th and 4th century BCE texts written on the relations 
between law, justice, and ἀρετή has revealed that when Glaucon refers to the 
myriad of people who construct natural theories on the essence and origins of 
justice, grounded in laws established by contract or agreement, he is indeed 
referring outside the text to a range of possible targets, some of which are Plato’s 
own peers and competitors: the Socratics. The Sophists could be intended tar-
gets too: and if we were in possession of the actual writings, say, of Hippias or 
of Protagoras – and not only of Xenophon’s and Plato’s potentially unreliable 
accounts of their views – we might be able to confirm this hypothesis.39 Sadly, 
these texts do not survive to any great extent. What does survive among the 
38  See P.S. Horky and M.R. Johnson, ‘On Law and Justice attributed to Archytas of Tarentum’, 
in D. Wolfsdorf (ed.), Early Greek Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), pp. 455–
90, at pp. 481–83.
39  Although, as Dimitri El Murr points out to me, the character Protagoras in Plato’s 
Theaetetus (167a–d) does advance a conventionalist take on justice. But his comments 
on justice and honour (δίκαια καὶ καλά) are fleetingly brief (167c), are not the focus of his 
speech, and have no strict comparanda with the surviving fragments.
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Sophists is inconsistent: on the one side, Gorgias’ surviving works and frag-
ments do not attest to the same formulations, interests, or assumptions found 
in Glaucon’s account, or in the other texts analysed today; and while the frag-
ments of Antiphon preserved in the Oxyrhynchus papyri (37 D38a–b) do treat 
some of the topics mentioned here, the way they pit law against nature shows 
little correlation with what Glaucon describes.40 For the purposes of contextu-
alizing the endoxic position advanced by Glaucon for the sake of a new start to 
Plato’s dialogue On Justice, the Socratics, along with Anonymus Iamblichi (who 
just may have been a Socratic himself), provide ample evidence of arguments 
that locate law and justice – a byword in Athenian democracy – at the heart of 
questions of ethical behaviour. The truth of the matter is probably not so deter-
minate: it would be an overstatement to say that the Socratics took one line on 
law, justice, and the good life, and the Sophists another that is wholly contrary; 
indeed, given what we have seen in this paper, not even the Socratics agree 
amongst themselves about what this relationship is supposed to be. The usual 
problem of classifying philosophical arguments, doctrines, principles, and 
expressions under ‘schools’ such as ‘Socratic’ or ‘Sophistic’, or even ‘Platonic’ or 
‘Aristotelian’, is as prevalent in the case of early philosophical texts on law and 
justice as it would be in just about any other subject in classical philosophy. 
Indeed, the very fact that a variety of positions obtains on a series of related 
themes within a given ‘school’, such as the ‘Socratics’, confirms precisely what 
we might assume to be the case: Socratic philosophy is best understood not 
as a commitment to an identifiable set of unquestionable assumptions, but 
rather as a dedication to collaborative pursuit of answers to an identifiable 
set of questions amongst a group of like-minded peers. This is the nature of 
philosophical enquiry – at least with respect to the topics of law and justice, 
among the students of the most famous know-it-all who himself claimed to 
know nothing, Socrates.41
40  Cf. Bonazzi, ‘Antiphon’s Truth and Concord’, pp. 155–8.
41  My greatest thanks are to Dimitri El Murr, René De Nicolay, and Anthony Bonnemaison, 
who pressed me on several issues throughout this paper.
